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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER PRESTON BOGESS, JR., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16894 
LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
------
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah is appealing the granting of a 
writ of habeas corpus which was granted because respondent's 
(petitioner therein) attorney failed to file a timely appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District, the Honorable David K. 
Winder presiding, ordered that if this Court did not take 
jurisdiction of respondent's out-of-time appeal by January 6, 
1980, he was to be released and his conviction of manslaughter, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953, as amended), 
was to be set aside on that date. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the granting-of the writ 
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of habeas corpus and requests that this Court take jurisdicti~~ 
of an out-of-time appeal by respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent, Walter Boggess, was tried for second 
degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953, 
as amended) on May 18, 1978, before the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock of the Fourth Judicial District. The following facts 
were presented at the hearing on respondent's writ of habeas 
corpus before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. of the 
Third Judicial District on November 30, 1978. 
~ 
After discussing ;the various degrees of murder, 
manslaughter and negligent homicide with respondent, (T. 10,14)~: 
appointed counsel, George Mangan, concluded that manslaughter, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953, as amended), was "the only 
justifiable lesser included offense," (T. 11) and he pursued 
that the6ry at trial. Respondent was convicted of manslaughter! 
on May 19, 1978. Prior to sentencing and again at the sentencii! 
hearing, respondent told Mangan that he was satisfied with the 
jury's verdict and that he did not wish to appeal (T. 12,13). 
Later, in a letter dated July 10, 1978, respondent requested 
that Mangan file an appeal in his behalf (T.5). Respondent 
testified that he first learned of the offense of negligent 
homicide, Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-206 (1953, as amended), while 
in prison, (T. 4) , and he believed the trial court erred in not 
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instructing the jury as to this lesser included offense. 
Mangan testified that he received the letter on July 18, 
1978 and that he had sufficient time in which to file an 
appeal by the July 20, 1978 deadline (T.13). 
Mangan informed respondent that there was no 
merit to an appeal and that he was no longer respondent's 
attorney. Mangan did not file a notice of appeal. Respondent 
also wrote to Uintah County to request that a transcript 
be prepared, (T.7), and he wrote a follow-up letter to Mangan 
on July 23, 1978 to inform him of this. On August 30, 1978, 
respondent filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus and 
post conviction relief alleging inter alia, that he had been 
denied his right to appeal. On November 30, 1978, the 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., ruled that respondent had 
been denied his right to appeal and his right to counsel 
under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution. Following a stipulation by the State, Judge 
Baldwin granted respondent permission to file an out-of-time 
appeal. On October 16, 1979, this Court refused to take 
jurisdiction of the appeal based on Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5 
(1953, as amended). State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979). 
On December 6, 1979, the Honorable David K. Winder 
ordered that if the Utah Supreme Court did not take jurisdiction 
of the substantive merits of an appeal by respondent within 
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thirty days, respondent's Petition for a Writ of Habeas 
corpus would be granted. On January 6,. 1980, the writ 
was granted, respondent was released from prison and his 
conviction set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE GRANTING OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
A 
BY STRICTLY CONSTRUING THE 
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT 
OF UTAH COD~ ANN. §77-39-5 
(1953, AS AMENDED), THIS 
COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT INVOLVED. 
Although there is no inherent or absolute right to 
appeal a criminal conviction, McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 
687 (1894), once the state has granted the privilege of appeal,, 
in a proper case, i.e. where the appellant has met the state's 
requirements for perfecting an appeal, the appeal becomes a 
"matter of right." Alaska Packer's Ass'n. v. Pillsbury, 301 
U.S. 174, 177 (1937). See, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 
610-611 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) 
This right for indigent defendants has been more fully defined 
in recent years. Once appellate review becomes an integral 
part of a state's criminal system, an indigent is protected 
-4-
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at all stages by the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1955), and he may not 
be barred access to any phase of the appellate process. 
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959). 
B 
AN INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO 
APPEAL IS GUARANTEED 
UNDER ANDERS V. CALIFORNIA. 
When a defendant claims that he has been denied his 
right to appeal he raises two questions. First, did the 
defendant request that his attorney file an appeal, or, if 
-- not, should his attorney have realized that an appeal may have 
some merit? If the answer to either of the above inquiries 
is yes, then the second question is why wasn't an appeal 
filed? Whether a defendant has been denied his constitutional 
right in such a situation depends on the facts of each case. 
See, State v. Carter, 551 P.2d 821, 827 (Kan. 1976); Wimberli 
v. State, 536 P.2d 945, 950 (Okla. 1975); State v. Heath, 27 
Utah 2d 13, 16, 492 P.2d 978, 980 (1972). 
If the defendant and his attorney made a tactical 
decision not to appeal, or reached the conclusion that an 
appeal would be unavailing, and consequently did not file 
notice of appeal within one month after the entry of the 
judgment appealed from, Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-5 (1953), 
-5-
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then the defendant has not been denied his right to appeal 
and he is precluded from substituting a writ of habeas corpus 
for a timely appeal. In Short v. Smith, 550 P.2d 204 (Utah 
1976), the defendant, who had been convicted of forgery, 
failed to perfect an appeal within the statutory period but 
later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that 
he should have been convicted only of a misdemeanor and not 
of a felony. This Court found the appeal from the denial of 
the writ to be without merit, stating, "he cannot substitute 
a habeas corpus proceeding for an orderly, statutory appeal." 
Id. at 204. Accord, Ex parte Dixon, 264 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1953); 
Mahaffey v. State, 392 P.2d 423, 425 (Idaho 1964). 
In the instant case, respondent requested that his 
attorney file an appeal. No appeal was filed by Mangan because 
he believed he was no longer respondent's attorney and because 
he thought it was a waste of time. The duty of appointed 
counsel in such a situation has been clarified by Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and its progeny. In Anders, 
appointed counsel in a letter to the appellate court stated: 
"I will not file a brief on appeal as I am of the opinion that 
there is no merit to the appeal." Id. at 742. In the instant 
case, appointed counsel's letter of May 18, 1978 stated: "In 
good conscience, I cannot prosecute an appeal for you .•. I 
don't believe there is any basis for an appeal." (Ex. 3-P). 
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The United States Supreme Court's solution to the dilemma 
faced by appointed counsel is: 
. • . if counsel finds his case to be 
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious 
examination of it, he should so advise 
the court and request permission to 
withdraw. That request must however, 
be accompanied by a brief referring to 
anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal. 
Counsel is also required to include any points 
which defendant wishes to raise. Id. at 744. The court 
will then examine the points raised and if any are found to 
have merit, defendant is entitled to have counsel appointed 
to aid him on appeal. Id. at 744. 
c 
RESPONDENT BELIEVED THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
THIS ERROR MAY ONLY BE RAISED 
ON APPEAL. 
The difference between habeas corpus and appeal is 
clear. The remedy for any claimed error or irregularity at 
trial, is to seek review and correction on appeal. Generally, 
habeas corpus is designed to provide speedy release from 
illegal incarceration and may not be used to review a conviction 
in lieu of an appeal. 
If the contention of error is something 
which is known or should be known to the 
partv at the time the judgment was entered, 
-7-
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it must be reviewed in the manner and 
within the time permitted by regular 
prescribed procedure, or the judgment 
becomes final and is not subject to 
further attack, • • • Were it other-
wise, the regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and the limitations 
of time specified therein would be 
rendered impotent. 
Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). 
Accord, Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1980); 
Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1976); Maguire v. 
Smith, 547 P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1976). 
It 
This Court has stated, however, that a final judgmen1~I 
may be subject to habeas c~rpus attack under the "most unusualm 
circumstances," such as where "there has been substantial 
failure to accord the accused due process of law; • . • or 
some other such circumstance that it would be wholly unconsioncj 
not to re-examine the conviction." Gallegos v. Turner, 17 
Utah 2d 273, 275, 409 P.2d 386, 387 (1965), (following full 
appellant review); Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 98, 440 P.2c1 
968, 969 (1968), (where defendant failed to appeal within the 
statutory period) . 
In the instant case, respondent claims that the trial 
court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser 
included offense of negligent homicide. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37 
(1953) states, " 
. Exceptions to instructions to the jury 
shall be taken and preserved as in civil cases." Generally, 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 51 requires that the complaining party object 
to the instruction at the trial level, or he will be precluded 
from raising the objection on appeal. DeBry and Hilton Travel 
v. Capitol Intern. Airways, 583 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Utah 1978); 
Cordner v. Clinger's Incorporated, 15 Utah 2d 85, 87, 387 P.2d 
685, 686 (1963). 
Since Rule 51 requires that an exception be made to 
the instruction at trial, it follows that the claimed error 
"is something which is known or should be known" at the time 
of trial, and therefore must be reviewed on appeal and may 
not be collaterally attacked through a writ of habeas corpus. 
Rule 51, also gives the appellate court discretion to hear 
the objection, raised first on appeal, in the interests of 
justice. Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 64, 475 P.2d 839, 
840 (1970); Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427 429, 403 P.2d 
166, 167 (1965). This Court has applied this same standard in 
criminal cases. State v. Villiard, 27 Utah 2d 204, 205, 494 
p • 2d 2 8 5 , 2 8 6 ( 19 7 2) • 
The unusual circumstances, in the instant case, 
which urge review of the error initially asserted on appeal, 
is the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent claims that Mangan negligently failed 
to request an instruction regarding negligent homicide. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel may explain why no exception 
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was taken at trial and compel the appellate court, in the 
interests of justice, to hear an objection that is first 
raised on appeal. Utah R. Civ. P. 51. Even though ineffectiv 
assistance of counsel warrants review of the alleged error 
on appeal, it does not necessarily justify resort to a writ 
of habeas corpus by respondent. Where ineffective represen-
tation reaches constitutional proportions, resort to habeas 
corpus may be warranted. The old standard for resort to 
habeas corpus was that counsel must be so ineffective that 
the trial is reduced to a sham and a mockery of justice. 
E.g., Barron v. State, 437JP.2d 975, 977 (Ariz. 1968)~ State 
v. King, 142 S.E.2d 880, 882 (W.Va. 1965). Recent cases 
have adopted the stricter standard of reasonably competent 
assistance. Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1980); 
People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979). This Court 
has addressed the question in several recent cases. In 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), the Court 
required that the attorney provide competent assistance, 
Id. at 204, but held in that case that the trial had not 
been reduced to "a farce, or a sham." Id. at 205. And in 
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979), the Court moved 
closer to the stricter standard when it stated: 
We do not mean to be understood as 
saying that a defendant can only 
succeed in showing that he was 
-10-
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deprived of counsel by showing that 
his attorney's failures reduced his 
trial to "a farce or a mockery of 
justice." 
Id. at 920 n.5. 
But where the actions of the attorney involve elements of 
discretion or judgement, they will not consitute ineffective 
assistance sufficient to sustain habeas corpus relief. E.g., 
Landers v. State, 437 P.2d 681, 682 (Ariz. 1968); Thomas v. 
Rhay, 472 P.2d 606, 607 (Wash. 1970). 
In the instant case, prior to trial, Mangan discussed 
the various degrees of murder, manslaughter and negligent 
homicide with respondent at length. After hearing respondent's 
statement of facts, Mangan exercised his judgment, and con-
eluded that the only lesser included offense which could be 
justified was manslaughter. Comparing the facts of a case 
to the elements of an offense, clearly calls upon an attorney 
to exercise this kind of judgment. Additionally, Mangan, at 
respondent's request, attempted to arrange for a guilty plea 
to a reduced change of manslaughter. (T.10). Mangan's 
representation of respondent was neither perfunctory nor 
ineffective. 
The facts in this case do not support the conclusion 
that respondent was denied reasonably competent assistance 
of counsel or that his trial was a sham and a mockery of 
-11-
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justice, therefore defendant may not resort to a writ of 
habeas corpus in order to have his claimed error reviewed. 
However, Utah R. Civ. P. 51, all.ows for review of that same 
error on appeal "in the interests of justice." The standard 
on appeal is simply what the appellate court considers to be 
fair, while for a writ of habeas corpus respondent must 
prove that counsel was not reasonably competent and that 
if he had been, there was a "reasonable likelihood of a 
different result." State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 197~ 
D 
RELEASING D~FENDANT AND 
SETTING ASIDE HIS CON-
VICTION, IS NOT THE 
PROPER REMEDY. 
Respondent desired to appeal his conviction, he had 
ioi 
wil 
:i 
an issue which could only be properly raised on appeal and no M 
appeal was filed by his appointed counsel. Respondent's 
right to appeal has not been denied through any fault of the 
State. Upon learning the facts of this case, the State 
attempted to aid respondent and the interest of justice by 
stipulating to a late appeal. The result in this case, 
releasing respondent and setting aside his conviction, is 
wholly untenable. Granting defendants a second day in court, 
where they and their counsel are solely respor.sible for any 
constitutional defects in the conviction, places an unreasonabl 
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strain on the prosecutorial resources of the state. The 
constitutional defect can arise from an honest mistake or 
miscommunication between respondent and his attorney. For 
example: 
1) Even if we assume that all appointed attorneys 
will understand the duty imposed on them by Anders v. California, 
a delay may still occur, as it did here, where the attorney 
believed his representation to be at an end. 
2) If Mangan had been out of town on July 18, 1978 
and had not returned until after the one month period had run, 
respondent would have been denied his right to appeal. 
3) A similar result would occur if the attorney 
became suddenly ill, or if the notice of appeal was simply 
misplaced in his office. Effective and efficient law enforcement 
dictates the need for some alternative to a full retrial of 
the defendant in such situations. 
The result in this case allows for subterfuge by 
future defendants. 
4) A defendant may vacillate in his requests for 
an appeal to such a degree that his attorney may conclude 
that the defendant did not want to appeal. After the one 
month period has expired, the defendant may claim he did 
wish to appeal and that he had so instructed his attorney. 
5) At the time of sentencing, a defendant can inform 
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the court that he intends to appeal and later allow counsel 
to convince him that an appeal is pointless. Once the 
statutory period runs, the defendant can point to his state-
ment in the record and allege that his attorney was negligent. ~ 
6) A defendant and his unscrupulous attorney, or 
his simply over-zealous attorney who honestly believes in 
the innocence of his client, can agree that the attorney will ~ 
admit to negligently failing to file the requested notice of 
appeal in order to give the defendant a second chance at trial. 1 
In any of these factual settings, the defendant will ( 
be undermining the eff icie~cy of and respect for the legal 
system. Through no fault of the State, prosecutorial resources: 
will be wasted in seeking a second conviction. That portion 
of the public which is aware of the defendant's crime and 
conviction, will lose respect for and faith in our legal systerr 
when they observe, as we have here, a convicted killer back 
on the street so soon after his conviction. 
Some alternative, to releasing respondent and setting 
aside his conviction, which will protect both his·constitutiona 
rights and the interests of the State must be found. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE PRINCIPLE 
OF CONSTRUCTIVE FILING OF NOTICE OF 
APPEAL IN ORDER TO TAKE JURISDICTION 
OF LATE APPEALS IN THE INTERESTS OF 
JUSTICE. 
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In Utah, perfection of an appeal is jurisdictional. 
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927, 929 (Utah 1979); Sullivan v. 
District Court, 65 Utah 400, 404, 237 P. 516, 518 (1925). 
Generally, courts have no inherent power to extend the time 
for taking an appeal, Blackwelder v. Naylor, 439 P.2d 202, 
203 (Okla. 1967), (a civil case), but that power may be conferred 
upon the court by statute. E.g., People v. Krebs, 400 P.2d 
323, 323 (Cal. 1965), (in which the California Rules of Court, 
at that time, allowed for "relief from default in a proper 
case."); City of Goldendale v. Graves, 562 P.2d 1272, 1276 
(Wash. 1977), (in which the statute allowed the court to take 
jurisdiction where failure to file a timely appeal was due 
to "excusable neglect."). 
Where no such statutory power exists, a potential 
solution lies in the principle of constructive filing of 
notice of appeal. This principle had its beginning in People 
v. Slobodion, 181 P.2d 868 (Cal. 1947), in which an incarcerated 
defendant delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities 
for mailing to the clerk of the court, six days prior to the 
last day of the statutory period for filing. Due to the 
neglect of prison officials, the notice was not received by 
the clerk until five days after the period had run. The 
principle was based on a notion of estoppel. "It would be 
absurd to hold in a criminal case that the state may extend 
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the right of appeal contingent upon timely pursuit thereof 
and then deny such fundamental right because the state's 
employees were remiss in complying with the state's law." 
Id. at 871. The court said that both justice and reason 
require that the appellant not be deprived of his right 
to appeal where he had taken all steps he was individually 
able to, and where the delay was not due to any fault of 
his. Appellant's actions under such circumstances constituted 
constructive filing of notice of appeal. Id. at 871. 
The principle was expanded in People v. Dailey, 345 
P.2d 558 (Cal. 1959), to i~clude the situation where an 
incarcerated appellant delivers his notice of appeal to prison 
officials on the last day on which the appeal may be filed, 
even though it would necessarily reach the clerk of the 
court after the period had run. This was to assure that 
an incarcerated appellant had the same ten day appeal period 
as did an individual who was not in prison. 
The principle was applied to a factual situation 
similar to that of the instant case in Re Benoit, 514 P.2d 47 
{Cal. 1973). In that case, the court acknowledged that under 
California law, appellate review is jurisdictional and that 
California statutes do not expressly allow consideration of 
late appeals. Further, the court noted that, the statutory 
period for appeal had recently been changed from ten to sixty 
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days, and Rule 250, California Rules of Court, which requires 
the judge at the time of sentencing "to advise defendant of 
his right to appeal, of the time and necessary steps for 
taking an appeal, and of the right of an indigent appellant 
to have counsel appointed for him ..• ,"had recently been 
adopted. These changes were expressly designed to eliminate 
the causes of late appeals. Id. at 105. Nevertheless, these 
alterations did not preclude the use of the principle of 
constructive filing which "embodies nothing more than a basis 
for judicial acceptance of an excuse for the appellant's 
delay in order to do justice." Id. at 104. In Benoit, the 
appellant requested that his appointed counsel file an appeal 
following his first conviction. No timely appeal was made 
due to the confusion generated by appellant being immediately 
removed to a second county where he was represented by 
different appointed counsel and tried for an unrelated felony. 
The court found earlier cases to be distinguishable in that 
each involved state action through prison employees who 
either prevented the appellant from filing a timely appeal 
or induced the appellant to rely upon their representations 
of assistance and lulled him into a false sense of security. 
Id. at 106. Also, in each case, the delay was not substantially 
due to any fault of appellant. In Benoit, the delay was not 
through any fault of the state, but resulted from a lack of 
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communication between appellant and his first appointed 
counsel, . who said he would file the appeal and later ·1.u 
mistakenly believed that appellant's second appointed 
counsel would perfect the appeal. The court said that __ 
appellant was even more justified in relying on the state-
ments of his own attorney than were earlier appellants in 
relying on prison officials, since his own attorney was 
better acquainted with the law and more likely to be concerned 
with the appellant's cause. Id. at 106. The court further 
required that appellant explain any delay in requesting an 
appeal and that he diligently pursue the appeal once the 
request had been made of his attorney. Id. at 107. Accord, 
People v. Leftwich, 158 Cal. Rptr. 758, 97 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 
6 (1979). 
In the instant case, Mangan, received a written 
request from respondent that an appeal be filed. Mangan 
testified that he had time to file an appeal before the 
July 20th deadline. Due to a misunderstanding regarding his 
continued role as respondent's attorney, no appeal was filed 
within the statutory period. The District Court accepted 
respondent's explanation that the delay in requesting an 
appeal was due to respondent's lack of knowledge of the 
offense of negligent homicide. Once respondent had made a 
timely request of his attorney, he diligently pursued the 
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appeal by immediately requesting a copy of his transcript 
and by writing a followup letter to Mangan to inform him of 
this. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
adopt the principle of constructive filing of notice of 
appeal. This will not entail a significant departure from 
the statutory one month period in which an appeal must be 
filed. An appellant is still required to request that his 
attorney file an appeal early enough to allow the attorney 
time to file within the statutory period. Nor will this 
encourage laxity on the part of appellant and his counsel 
since appelld~t must explain any delay and exercise reasonable 
diligence in perfecting the appeal once he has requested it. 
In fact, this will encourage prompt filing since an appellant 
will no longer profit by failing to file, whether due to 
mistake or subterfuge, and seeking a writ of habeas corpus 
claiming he was denied the right to appeal. 
Respondent, herein, over the advise of counsel, 
decided to take an appeal. He was able to explain the delay 
and demonstrate his diligence to the satisfaction of the 
district court. He did all he was individually capable of 
doing and then relied on his appointed counsel to complete 
his assigned duties. It would not only be unjust to hold 
defendant accountable for the negligence of his appointed 
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attorney, it might very well violate his constitutional 
rights. 
By adopting the principle of constructive filing 
of notice of appeal and accepting an out-of-time appeal 
under the proper circumstances, this Court would not be 
expanding the constitutional rights of appellants. More 
correctly, this Court would be guaranteeing that the rights 
of an indigent appellant will not be compromised by the 
negligence or misunderstanding of his appointed counsel. 
The principle of constructive filing will also 
be of benefit to the state. In light of this Court's prior 
decision not to take jurisdiction of an out-of-time appeal, 
State v. Boggess, 601 P.2d 927 (Utah 1979), the state is 
given the choice of acquiescing in the freedom of a convicted 
killer or incurring the time and expense of a second trial. 
This would also eliminate the potential for subterfuge by a 
defendant seeking a second opportunity for acquittal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's right to appeal is not controlled solely 
by jurisdictional considerations, but also involves constitutic 
issues. Under Anders v. California, appointed counsel must 
aid an indigent with his appeal, even if counsel believes 
the appeal to be without merit. Mr. Boggess, an indigent 
defendant desired and requested that his conviction be 
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appealed. He has raised an issue from his trial that can 
only be properly heard on appeal, and not in a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus. Appointed counsel's failure to 
file a appeal has denied defendant his constitutional rights. 
Where this has occurred through no fault of the state, some 
remedy must be fashioned which will protect the rights of 
the defendant as well as the interests of the state. 
The principle of constructive filing of notice of 
appeal is such a remedy. The defendant is still bound to 
file within one month of the judgment appealed from, but 
where something delays or prevents the attorney from carrying 
out the instructions of his client, the defendant will be 
deemed to have filed within the statutory period, as long as 
he, 1) adequately explains the delay, 2) demonstrates his 
diligence in pursuing the appeal through his appointed counsel 
and 3) gives his attorney sufficient time to file notice of 
appeal after the request is made. 
Both the State and future defendants will benefit 
from the adoption of this principle. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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